

# **Oil, Iraq and US foreign policy in the Middle East**

**Irene Gendzier**

As tensions across the world rise in anticipation of Washington's war on Iraq, the Bush administration continues to focus on Baghdad's possession of weapons of mass destruction as its prime justification for war. The role of the US in facilitating Iraq's acquisition of such weapons is ignored, or justified in terms of the Iran-Iraq war. Little is said of the continuation of such assistance after that date. Similarly evaded in public talk is the broader political agenda that shapes current US policy in the region, including its inextricable connection with the role of oil in US policy.

By November 2002, the White House was reported to have "settled on a war plan for Iraq," that "calls for massing 200,000 to 250,000 troops for attack by air, land and sea."<sup>1</sup> What was its purpose?

To be sure, US administrations have seldom publicly justified their policies in the Middle East in terms of assuring privileged access to the region's oil resources, or protecting the interests of US oil companies. In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, moreover, US policy in the Middle East has been couched nearly exclusively in terms of the US 'war on terror.' Indeed, the pursuit of US oil politics in the Middle East as well as Central Asia, has become inseparable from the 'war on terror,' but as the discussion that follows demonstrates, the politics of oil and the military have far deeper roots in US policy. This does not prevent commentators, so inclined, to continue to argue that oil has nothing to do with US policy in Iraq.<sup>2</sup> Military analysts suffered no such illusions.

The report of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), issued in the fall of 2002, was unambiguous about the role of oil, the permanence of the US military in the Gulf, and the high risks of reform to US interests. 'Beyond Containment: Defending US Interests in the Persian Gulf,' the INSS

report, declared that “the US presence in the Gulf is primarily intended to maintain the flow of oil by preventing a hostile power from establishing hegemony over the region...”<sup>3</sup>. The language common to decades of presidential pronouncements bearing on US Middle East policy focused on the need to assure the permanence of a US military presence in the region by diminishing its political costs to the US and its allies. In this context, Iraq was a threat that inhibited US action.<sup>4</sup> But the removal of Saddam Hussein would offer no permanent solution, the report conceded: it “does not mean that the United States can safely end its military engagement in the Persian Gulf, given its strategic location, role in global energy markets, and vulnerability to other potential threats. In short, removing Saddam Hussein is no panacea. There is no escaping the US role as a guarantor of Gulf stability.”<sup>5</sup> To the extent that such reviews helped to demystify US policy, they led - however inadvertently - to more sustained inquiries concerning what we knew or should have known about US policies, those currently justified in the name of the US ‘war on terror’ as well as their antecedents.

Barely a month after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, *Business Week* reminded readers that the US economy was ailing and that the country was more vulnerable to an “oil shock” than it had been at the time of the first Gulf War. The reference was to the feared hike in oil prices stemming from diminished global reserves which were held to be a product of US sanctions against Libya and Iran, and “tight national budgets in oil-producing nations.”<sup>6</sup>

Announcements of US oil dependency were commonplace in the aftermath of 9/11. They were invariably followed by urgent recommendations for increased diversification of the sources of US oil imports outside of the Middle East. In practice, such diversification had long been a fact of oil politics, although 9/11 gave it a renewed political currency. What occurred in the oil markets after that date was an immediate drop in oil prices that was to rise again in anticipation of a US war in Iraq. In the interval, however, certain trends emerged that appeared to represent wide-ranging changes in the ‘landscape’ of oil politics. They entailed the ongoing expansion of US oil and gas interests, including in Russia, whose relationship with the US was the subject of intense interest – as was its potential impact on Saudi Arabia and OPEC. The valued US-Russian connection, however, was also the site of intense competition and mistrust, particularly in the light of US political, military as well as commercial expansion into the region of the Caucasuses and Central Asia.

*Business Week* warned its readers that oil accounted for “40% of the nation’s energy.” The US was importing “51.6% of its oil needs and relies on OPEC for about half of that - roughly 26% of total consumption”. With this came the reminder that OPEC’s eleven oil-producing states accounted for nearly two thirds of the world’s crude oil exports. The news was hardly new.

Neither was Saudi Arabia's dominance in this context, as a November 2001 estimate confirmed.<sup>7</sup> The kingdom exported 7.8 millions of barrels per day (mbd), followed by Venezuela at 2.7 mbd., Iran at 2.6 mbd., United Arab Emirates at 2.2 mbd., and Iraq at 2.1mbd. Equally noteworthy was Russia's production, which stood at the time at 4.3 mbd., with an estimated 10.4% of world's output.

The response to such data ranged from support for greater reliance and expansion of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge of Alaska, diversifying energy sources outside of the Middle East and challenging US sanction policies in states such as Iran and Libya.

At the official level, the Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPD), appeared in the spring of 2001. Published under the title: "Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future," it offered a predictable assessment of oil dependency and the need to diversify imports, although its authors noted that diversification offered no immunity against disruption of foreign sources. Its authors emphasised that the US consumed "over 25% of the oil produced worldwide, slightly more than half of which it imports."<sup>8</sup> Hence, it warned that without a shift in policy "the share of US oil demand met by net imports is projected to increase from 52% in 2000 to 64% in 2020."<sup>9</sup> Saudi Arabia was identified as the "lynchpin of supply reliability to world oil markets," with the Gulf, "projected to supply between 54% and 67% of the world's oil."<sup>10</sup> Pointing to the continued importance of western hemisphere sources, the NEPD encouraged the expansion of US oil interests in Africa, Russia and the states of the former Soviet republics in the Caucuses and Central Asia.

In Paris, petroleum expert Nicolas Sarkis identified the "closer ties between the US and Russia, heightened interest and investment in alternative oil-producing regions such as central Asia and west Africa." as among significant long-term indicators. But Sarkis argued that none of these developments would fundamentally offset the role of Middle East oil, although he reckoned that "with two-thirds of proven oil reserves and 44.5% of the world's oil exports, the countries of the Middle East are now at the top of the list in the war on terrorism."<sup>11</sup>

Several weeks after 9/11, Assistant Secretary of State William J. Burns addressed the Middle East Institute in Washington. His remarks were designed to assure his audience that the Middle East remained a major concern of the administration. "Since the end of the Second World War," Burns insisted, "the United States has understood that a secure, prosperous and stable Middle East is an essential ingredient not only in defending vital American interests, but also the interests of the world economy." Thus Burns reiterated the administration's claims that it was committed to a resolution of the major political conflicts in the region and that it was fully appreciative of

the fact that a region “mired in internal conflict serves neither the interests of the people of the region nor the people of the United States.”<sup>12</sup>

In practice, the US endorsement of political reform in the Middle East - as in Latin America and South East Asia - penalized reformers who resisted US policies and promoted ruling elites of compatible outlooks. Under the circumstances, neither princes, nor clerics, nor secular reformers with serious political intent were in demand. The fate of Gulf elites who aspired to more representative political systems was equally dismal. The logic of Washington’s Middle East policy was centred on assuring the security of its oil and related interests, not simply to guarantee petroleum profits but to assure control over resources essential to the expansion of its economic growth and political power. In this context, nationalist, populist or reformist movements that challenged the distribution of oil wealth, let alone other key aspects of domestic and foreign policy, represented unacceptable risks. The message was repeated by military analysts after 9/11, as in the report of the INSS, “Beyond Containment: Defending US Interests in the Persian Gulf.”

The short history of US policy in the Middle East, including the succession of presidential ‘doctrines,’ from Truman through to Bush II, confirmed Washington’s appreciation of the strategic role of the Eastern Mediterranean and the oil rich states of the Middle East in the broader context of US policy goals. Threats of the use of force and ‘regime change,’ as in UK-US policy in Iran in 1953, illustrate the approach. But the developments following the coup that brought the Shah back to power, also exposed the tensions between corporate and state interests, as US oil majors in Saudi Arabia were reluctant to invest in what they regarded as an uncertain situation, i.e. that of Iran in 1953. They were persuaded otherwise by the US government.

In 1956 the British and French, along with Israel, invaded Egypt in response to Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Two years later, Eisenhower resisted the British Prime Minister’s call to intervene in Iraq, where revolution brought down the Hashemite monarchy and the entire political edifice on which it rested, which was a product of the British mandate and continuing British power. Within hours of that event, Eisenhower called for US troops to intervene in Lebanon, then in the midst of its first civil war.<sup>13</sup> Simultaneously, the US backed a British intervention in Jordan. US action in Lebanon, which preceded the events in Baghdad, was designed to assure the emergence of a politically reliable leadership, one that excluded the socialist politician, Kamal Jumblatt. His leadership, US oil companies feared, would put the US pipeline, TAPLINE, that carried ARAMCO’s oil to the Mediterranean, at risk.

Further East, the US was involved in supporting counterrevolutionary policies in the Arabian peninsula in a covert campaign that attracted little attention in the US. The US not only armed its allies in Saudi Arabia: by the

early 1970s Kuwait and North Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, had also become eligible recipients of US military assistance. “Everyone has heard of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961,” wrote Fred Halliday in a major work on the Arabian peninsula, “but not its Arabian counterpart - the September 1972 attack on South Yemen, when thousands of right-wing exiles and their tribal allies hurled themselves against the boundaries of the beleaguered anti-imperialist republic.”<sup>14</sup> The US relied on Iran during the 1973 oil crisis to send some 10,000 troops into Dhofar province in Oman in order to crush its guerrilla movement. Iran was active in support of US policy outside of the Middle East as well in this period, as the Shah’s support for the US in Vietnam made clear.

The fall of the Shah in 1979 and the emergence of the Khomeini regime in Iran were momentous events which, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were viewed in Washington as threats to its interests that risked worse damage. The Carter Doctrine, of direct relevance to US policy in Iraq in 2002, announced that “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”<sup>15</sup> Relying on its select allies in the region, Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Gulf states, Washington enhanced its position through the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force and newly established bases in the Gulf.

The Iran–Iraq war coincided with a period, 1980–1988, that the US Department of State (DOS) identified as one in which the Iraqi regime committed “Crimes Against Humanity,”<sup>16</sup> In this period, according to the DOS, the Iraqi dictator “ordered the use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces in the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, and against Iraq’s Kurdish population in 1988. The 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war left 150,000 to 340,000 Iraqi and 450,000 to 730,000 Iranians dead.” In the same terrible years, both Iran and Iraq received arms from foreign sources, including the United States, the Soviet Union and France, with North Korea and Israel providing arms to Iran. Assessments of this arms traffic demonstrate, however, that “between 1981 and 1988 Iraq received 77% of the arms delivered to the two belligerents (in dollar terms) while Iran received only 23%.”<sup>17</sup>

Between 1985–1990, according to Henry Gonzalez, former Chairman of the House Banking Committee, the US Commerce Dept. “approved at least 220 export licenses for the Iraqi armed forces, major weapons complexes, and enterprises identified by the Central Intelligence Agency as diverting technology to weapons programs.”<sup>18</sup> Gonzalez cited that figure on Oct. 28, 1992, in an ABC news show. On the previous day, he was reported to have said that in the same period, “the Reagan and Bush Administrations approved 771 export licenses for Iraq - 239 of these approvals came from the

Bush Administration” (Cited in Mark Pythian, *Arming Iraq*, Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1997, p.43.).

Former Deputy Defence Undersecretary Stephen Bryen, reported on the same occasion that the US administration encouraged “US companies to go to Iraq and do business there, and a lot of that that was sold was going right into the military programs.” As Bryen exclaimed “the [Bush] administration’s policy was to support Saddam Hussein, and not to look backwards, not to look sideways, look straight ahead and give him what he wanted. We coddled him, we supported him, he was ‘our guy.’ And just because he was building missiles, or just because he had a nuclear potential - the CIA warned about that, we know that now for sure - didn’t matter. They simply didn’t care.”

Details of the “US Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War,” known as the Riegle Report, were issued by Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman, and Alfonse D’Amato, Ranking Member of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration, on May 25, 1994, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session.<sup>19</sup> According to the Riegle Report, “records available from the supplier for the period from 1985 until the present show that during this time, pathogenic (meaning ‘disease producing’), toxigenic (meaning “poisonous”) and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the US Department of Commerce.”

More recently, in August, 2002, The New York Times reported on previously undisclosed aspects of the covert US program carried out under the Reagan administration. The Times report indicated that such a program “provided Iraq with critical battle planning assistance at a time when American intelligence agencies knew that Iraqi commanders would employ chemical weapons in waging the decisive battles of the Iran-Iraq war, according to senior military officers with direct knowledge of the program.”<sup>20</sup> These sources further revealed the following: “Though senior officials of the Reagan administration publicly condemned Iraq’s employment of mustard gas, sarin, VX and other poisonous agents, the American military officers said President Reagan, Vice President George Bush and senior national security aides never withdrew their support for the highly classified program in which more than 60 officers of the Defence Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq.” Further, it emerged that Defence intelligence officers recognised that Iraq had used chemical weapons in the Fao Peninsula, which was attacked with US “planning assistance” in 1988. The Pentagon’s response was a tolerant one. “It was just another way of killing people - whether with a bullet or phosgene, it didn’t make any difference,” according to this account.

As the 2002 issue of Newsweek magazine indicated: “It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build biological weapons. But it happened.”<sup>21</sup>

The tide turned on August 1, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US subsequently invaded Iraq. “Air Force sources said the allies dropped about 1,200 tons of explosives in 518 sorties against 28 oil targets. The intent, they said, was ‘the complete cessation of refining’ without damaging most crude oil production,” and targets included “major storage tanks; the gas/oil separators through which crude oil must pass on its way to refineries; the distilling towers and catalytic crackers at the heart of modern refineries; and the critical K2 pipeline junction near Beiji that connects northern oil fields, an export pipeline to Turkey and a reversible north-south pipeline inside Iraq.”<sup>22</sup> Iraq’s three refineries - the major modern ones, in Daura, Basra and Beiji, were bombed.

According to foreign sources, the Bush cabinet agreed as early as April 2001 that “Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East” which justified military intervention.<sup>23</sup> Neil Mackay, the journalist who published this account in *The Sunday Herald*, disclosed that Vice President Cheney had requested a study from the Baker Institute for Public Policy which endorsed such a policy. James Baker, former US Secretary of State under George Bush, Sr., sought counsel from Kenneth Lay, the ex-Enron chief indicted for fraud, along with a director of Shell, the regional head of British Petroleum, the head of ChevronTexaco, and an ex-oil minister from Kuwait. Cheney himself, as *The Sunday Herald* reminded its readers, had been at the head of the oil services company, Halliburton, although it omitted to mention that “Halliburton subsidiaries submitted \$23.8 million worth of contracts with Iraq to the United Nations in 1998 and 1999 for approval by the sanctions committee.”<sup>24</sup>

Baker’s advisers in BP and ChevronTexaco represented the interests of big oil, as opposed to the Independents. The distinction is worth noting as some analysts had described Bush foreign policy initiatives in the oil sector in the fall of 2001, as inadequately responsive to the interests of the oil giants who were disposed to favour a more internationalist policy. They concluded that there was a fundamental disjuncture between the Bush administration and “the true long-term interests of Big Oil in the US”<sup>25</sup> And in their estimate, “the Bush team is asking the US oil industry to wait until it is ready to accommodate US IOGC [International Oil and Gas Companies] interests.”

The benefits to big oil of Bush policies were broached in *The Washington Post* on Sept.15, 2002. Citing industry officials and leaders of the Iraqi opposition, David Ottaway and Dan Morgan suggested that a US-led ousting of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein “could open a bonanza for American oil companies long banished from Iraq, scuttling oil deals between

Baghdad and Russia, France and other countries, and reshuffling world petroleum markets, according to industry officials and leaders of the Iraqi opposition.”<sup>26</sup>

Former CIA director, James Woolsey, one of the signatories of the 1998 letter to Trent Lott and Newt Gingrich that had called for Saddam Hussein’s ousting, was cited in the same article. Woolsey addressed the sensitive question of the fate of foreign investors in Iraq whose governments did not support the US position, a matter of direct concern to Russian and French investors who were heavily engaged in Iraq and or seeking contracts with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The price of resisting US policy was economic blackmail, as Woolsey’s position suggested. If a new government was in place in Baghdad, it might well choose to ignore existing contracts and favour US firms, perhaps those such as ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco.

Would there be international recourse against such actions? The question was posed by oil specialists who acknowledged that “European and Russian oil companies face losing their grip on Iraqi oil field projects to US energy firms if the country’s opposition party is brought to power in a US-forced coup.”<sup>27</sup> In addition, there was widespread speculation and anxiety about the impact of a US attack against Iraq on oil prices, a position shared by oil producers around the world, as well as by consumers who recalled past experience. The subject, however, was not publicly aired by the Bush White House, although analysts in the US warned of the significant risks posed by US pre-emptive action for “treasuries and foreign ministries around the world.”<sup>28</sup>

At a public level, Washington talked of Iraq in altogether different terms. The anticipated but undeclared US invasion of Iraq was justified by the President’s Special Assistant for Near East, Southwest Asian, and North African affairs, Zalmay Khalilzad, in terms of democracy. A former Unocal adviser who had favoured recognition of the Taliban, was now advocating US intervention “to achieve the disarmament mission and to get Iraq ready for a democratic transition and then through democracy over time.”<sup>29</sup>

Through the fall of 2002, on the other hand, it was not democracy but invasion that was in the planning as US forces continued to be deployed in the Gulf. The planned transfer of General Tommy Franks and some 600 senior level officers from their base in Florida to al Udeid in Doha, Qatar, was viewed by some “as a precursor to the initiation of combat, as the officers involved are responsible for the management of all US forces in the region.”<sup>30</sup> Of related interest was a different assessment of Qatar, this time by the James A. Baker III, Institute for Public Policy, which identified it as containing “the third largest natural gas reserves and the largest non-associated gas field in the world.”<sup>31</sup>

The US troop deployments in the Gulf, and particularly the continuing US and UK ‘bombing runs’ over Iraqi ‘no flight zones’ through the fall of



2002, constituted “a low grade war.”<sup>32</sup> It was a war whose origins stemmed, as stated earlier, from the first Gulf War and whose objectives included the control of oil. That subject remained largely off-limits in official remarks on the subject of Iraq. But the subject was far from being out of bounds in the circle of analysts writing for the neo-conservative think tanks with which the Bush administration had friendly ties. Among these, The Heritage Foundation, for instance, had much to say with regard both to the protection of Iraq’s oil installations in the “post-war” phase of the US occupation, and to its future allocation.<sup>33</sup>

Talk of occupation and its various prospects, including distribution of oil shares and retribution against contract holders loathe to lose their stakes, along with rehearsals for monarchical restorations and the subordination of dubious allies and endangered peoples, was premised on the existence of an unchallenged American power, one with the capacity to reorder Middle Eastern states like so many dominoes, in which oil, pipelines, politics and the seemingly limitless power of the military, guaranteed the outcome, in the eyes of its believers. The image, in short, was one of uncontested supremacy, a legacy of the Bush administration. In historical terms, however, the turning points that influenced the shape of US policy in the Middle East and the Gulf in 2002 belonged to an earlier period, and represented the consolidation of policies and power to which numerous administrations contributed. In that long view - admittedly short by historical standards - it was the decade that stretched between 1979 and the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War, which proved critical in the enhancement of US power. And by 2002, “the US ‘war on terror’ in what was former Soviet controlled territory promoted the conversion of “Central Asia into a quasi-protectorate - much as it did the Persian Gulf after Great Britain departed.”<sup>34</sup>

By the winter of 2002, the dissonance between Washington and the members of the international community opposed to war on Iraq had reached a critical point. UN arms inspectors continued with their assigned tasks, albeit in an environment aggravated and undermined by US pronouncements that threatened imminent war on Iraq. At the same time, the Bush administration insisted that war was to be a last resort, while continuing troop deployment into the region. In Washington, moreover, there was talk of implementing the ‘shock and awe’ strategy to assure a massive and traumatic defeat of the enemy.

Even prior to such pronouncements, those concerned with the possible impact of war on Iraqi civilians, made their own assessments known. Thus, the report of the International Physicians for the Prevention of War on “Collateral Damage,” and the UN report on “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios” in the aftermath of a US led war on Iraq, originally issued as a ‘strictly confidential’ account, aroused shock at the possible scale of human loss and awe at the nature of the likely accompanying destruction.

## Notes

I would like to thank David Peterson for his support and invaluable research assistance.

1. "War Plan for Iraq Calls for Big Force and Quick Strikes," The New York Times, Nov.10, 2002, p.1.
2. Roger Trilling, "Why the War Works," The Village Voice, Nov.13-19, 2002, p.1. [www.villagevoice](http://www.villagevoice)
3. "Beyond Containment: Defending US Interests in the Persian Gulf," Richard D Sokolsky, (Distinguished Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies [INSS] at Defense University); other contributors: Richard Kugler, Kenneth Pollack; Joseph McMillan; Eugene Rumer; Judith Yaffee. The above report summarizes a forthcoming book entitled, *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Redesigning US Forces for the post-Containment Era*, to be published by the National Defense University. The reference in the text is to p.12.
4. Ibid., p.1.
5. Ibid., p.2.
6. "What to do About Oil," Business Week Online, Oct.19, 2001, p.2.
7. David Barboza, "OPEC's Pain is US Gain," The New York Times, Nov. 16, 2001, C1.
8. Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, "National Energy Policy: Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future," US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 2001, Section 8, p.3.
9. Ibid. Section 1 p.13.
10. Ibid., Section 8, p.4.
11. Nicolas Sarkis, "Middle East Retains Supremacy in Global Oil Supplies," Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2002.
12. Assistant Sec. of State, William J. Burns, "Towards a Positive Agenda for the Middle East," Oct.19, 2001. Asst. Secretary of State Burns' speech can be read at: <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/offtxts/1020brns.htm>
13. For details on the 1958 US intervention, I.Gendzier, *Notes From the Minefield, United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958*. Columbia University Press, 1997; Westview Press, 1999.
14. Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, New York, Vintage Books, 1975, p.23. For Halliday's recent assessment of this work, see "Arabia Without Sultans Revisited," MERIP, July-September 1997, p.27-29.
15. President Carter's State of the Union Address, Jan.23, 1980, appears in Appendix 1 of Leila Meo, ed., *US Strategy in the Gulf: Intervention Against Liberation*, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., Belmont, Mass., US., 1981, p.122.
16. Iraq: Crimes Against Humanity - US Department of State/IIP, May 7, 2002. <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/crimes/>
17. Michael T.Klare, "Prelude to Desert Storm: Arms Transfers to Iran and Iraq During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and the Origins of the Gulf War," unpublished paper

prepared for the Conference "Reassessing the Gulf War," Boston University, Feb. 21, 2001, p.7.

18. As reported in the transcript record of ABC News Show, Nightline, Oct. 28, 1992, at which Gary Milhollin, Director of the The Wisconsin Project, who testified before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, US Senate, 102nd Congress, on Oct. 27, 1992, appeared.

19. The Riegle Report can be found on the website of the Gulf War Veterans: <http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/riefle1.html>

20. Patrick E. Tyler, "Officers Say US Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas," The New York Times, August 18, 2002, p.1

21. Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas, "How Saddam Happened," Newsweek, Sept.23, 2002, p.36.

22. Barton Gellman, "Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets," The Washington Post, June 23, 1991, p.A1.

23. This and related subjects are discussed in, I. Gendzier, "Invisible by Design: US Policy in the Middle East," Diplomatic History, 26, 4, Fall 2002, pp.593-618, which offers a partial overlap with the present discussion.

24.Cited in Nicholas D. Kristof, "Revolving-Door Monsters," The New York Times, Oct. 11, 2002, p.A 31.

25. Ibid., p.19.

26. Sept.15, 2002, Dan Morgan and David B Ottaway, "In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is Key Issue; US Drillers Eye Huge Petroleum Pool," The Washington Post, p. A01.

27. Martyn Wingrove, "Non-US Oil Interests at Risk Says Iraq Opposition," Lloyd's List, Oct. 18, 2002; and "Iraqi Opposition Prepared to Revise Oil Contracts with Foreign Companies," Kommersant, Moscow, Oct. 21, 2002.

28 Thomas Ferguson and Robert A Johnson, "Oil Economics Lubricates Push for War," Los Angeles Times, Oct. 13, 2002.

29. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "US Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report," The New York Times, Oct. 11, 2002, p.14.

30. Michael T. Klare, "War Plans and Pitfalls," The Nation, Oct.21, 2002, p.16.

31. Summary of presentation by Abdulla Bin Hamad Al-Attayah, "Qatar's Role in the Oil and Gas Industry," James A Baker III, Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, June 21, 2002.

32. Michael R. Gordon, "US Pilots in Gulf Use Southern Iraq for Practice Runs," The New York Times, Nov.3, 2002, p.1; and Serge Schmemmann, "Controlling Iraq's Oil Wouldn't be Simple," Week in Review, The New York Times, Section 4, p.1.

33. Baker Spring and Jack Spencer, "In Post-War Iraq, Use Military Forces to Secure Vital US Interests, Not for Nation Building," The Heritage Foundation, Sept. 25, 2002, background#1589; and Ariel Cohen and Dr Gerald P O'Driscoll, jr., "The Road to Economic Prosperity for a Post-Saddam Iraq," which is part of a series produced by the Foundation under the title: The Future of a Post-Saddam Iraq: A Blueprint for American Involvement." : <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast>

33. Andrew Bacevich, "Bases of Debate; America in Central Asia: Steppes to Empire," The National Interest summer 2002 (online)